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"Comparative effectiveness" is a relatively new
buzzxord in health care, gaining national attention
from the recently enacted health care reforms
and provisions in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The more
traditional pricing model in the United States
calculates charges on an objective fee-for-service
model." Comparative effectiveness, however, relies
on qualitative assessments of the patient's quality of
life, probability of a positive outcome, and the general
burden on society. Although qualitative comparative
effectiveness models are a reasonable way to control
costs at some level (e.g., using physician assistants
to perform annual physicals), once the care or the
treatment becomes more advanced and specialized,
the model begins to crack. Furthermore, the model
that relied on more cost effective alternatives and
standardized care falters if more lethal conditions
are considered and patients are simply more likely
to die than survive because of the serious nature of
their diseases. TFhe recent emergence of a subjective
standard to evaluating health care coverage based on
"quality of the outcome"' begs the question-whose
opinions will determine a treatment's "effectiveness"
and what are the desired results of the treatment?
Comparative effectiveness under the new health
care reform legislation factors cost into health care
decisions in a way that could be inimical to patient
care under bleak circumstances. Systems similar to the
British National IHealth Service, which narrow access
to medicines by denying drugs to entire populations
of disease sufferers or by limiting the amount of
medication available for specific diseases, 3 xill
have a disparate impact on the elderly and the poor,
particularly if applied in a system that stills prefers
private insurance. For example, the United Kingdom
denies a treatment for macular degeneration (a
condition that ultimately leads to blindness if untreated)
to most patients. When the health system's regulatory
body approves the treatment's usage, it will only pay for
enough medication to treat one eye.4 Independently
wealthy persons who can aflord the cost of treatment at
their own expense and those who can altford to invest in
private insurance will most likely maintain their sight,
xwhereas those without access to this medication. due
to the health care system's cost containment biases.
are left blind. This disparity is exen morc pronounced
with terminal diseases, as families lose precious time
with their loved ones when the government will not
cover life-extending treatments, such as cancer drugs,
due to cost.
This article will explore how using comparative
effectiveness and disease management as cost
containment measures poses an especially egregious
threat to patients with extremely aggressive diseases,
and can tie the hands of their health care providers.
Part I will provide a basic background and definition
of comparative effectiveness, as well as examples
of international implementation of comparative
effectiveness models. The article present the difficulties
inherent in equitably applying a comparative
effectiveness model to the current health insurance and
Food and Drug Administration drug approval regimes.
Part III will address how the potential conflict between
cost containment and quality care has the propensity
to harm some of the most disadvantaged members of
our society, particularly those with terminal diseases.
Specifically, the article argues that comparative
effectiveness should balance the potential harms with
the possible benefits of treatnent, similar to the current
expedited approval process for drugs, as opposed to
some of the more aggressive comparative effectiveness
cost containment schemes enacted in other countries.
Part 1111 analyzes the exacerbating impact of cost
containment measures on the pre-existing funding
biases, including lack of access to specialized care
for the extremely ill and the poor. Finally, this Article
concludes that, although expensive, treatment for
terminal patients is necessary and denying viable
alternatives due to inadequate funding violates the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
\While recent health eare dev elopments have thrust
discussions of comnparativ e efiectixveness into the
spotlight, comparatixe effectiveness actually is as old
as the study of medicine. Comparative effectiveness
now is defined as:
Comparison of the effectiveness of the risks
and benefits of two or more health care services
or treatments used to treat a specific disease
or condition (e.g. pharmaceuticals, medical
devices, medical procedures and other treatment
modalities) in approximate real-world settings.6
Even a small town family doctor is in a position to
make these types of judgments during the day-to-
day workiags of his practice. However, the primary
concern about comparative effectiveness is not when
science indicates that a certain treatment produces the
best result, which is obviously helpful to aid patients
and their families in making the best decisions and
reining in the runaway costs of health care. Rather, the
most pressing danger comes when these efficiencies
determine coverage specifically to control costs.
The comparative eftectiveness directive in the health
care reform package, including the funding provision
in ARRA creating an institute to study systematically
comparative effectiveness, strongly indicates that cost
containment will be a consideration in determining
funding and coverage, despite statutory requirements
to the contrarxy.' The Congressional Budget Office's
(CBO) study on comparative effectiveness stated that
one of its objectives was to link the information from
the study to financial incentives as the appropriate
method to change the behavior of health care providers
and consumers.9 Although the focus on research to
determine the best treatments for patients is laudable,10
the possibility of being denied life-prolonging
treatment due to cost is disconcerting.
The reality of comparative effectiveness as a cost
containment measure instead of a process to develop
more efficient treatment, evolved in countries where
the government is the primary third-party payer. For
instance, the British government created the National
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 1998 after
a laxvsuit filed by Pfiier in response to the goxvemnment
limiting the use of V iagia oxvei cost concerns.
Sometimes the U.K. taxpayer is able to challenge
the deniail of coverage successfull, 5 hut often
the determination refusing coyverage is final.1 For
example, NICEF refiused to cover the breast cancer drug
lapatinib in certain cases of metastatic breast cancer.1 4I
NICE predicted the treatmnent wxould gixve the particular
patients an axverage of an addirional tenx weeks of life.i
NICE, hovwever, does not pay for it because the pill
costs about £25,000 per year, despite the fact that
manufacturer GlaxoSmithKline agreed to pay for the
first twelve weeks of each treatment.i6 More than 3000
cancer patients in the U-nited Kingdom had to request
money from their local primary care trusts (PCT) as an
alternative funding method to NICE; more than 1,000
of those patients with breast cancer had their claims
rejected by the PC T as well.i As of December 2008.,
the life of a person in the United Kingdom was rarely
worth more than £22,750 semi-annually.1
If similar cost containment procedures are enacted in
the United States to control government health care
spending, millions of people-particularly the elderly
and the underserved-could face strict bureaucratic
obstacles when attempting to obtain treatment tor
terminal diseases. The FDA has defined several groups
of diseases that typically result in significant disability
or death for more aggressive approval procedures,.
including "rare diseases" and "orphan diseases." Rare
diseases are diseases that affect fewer than 200.000
people in the Inited States, or one in fifteen hundred
people.19 Orphan diseases include diseases for which
there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of
developing the drug will be recouped through sales
in the United States. Orphan diseases also encompass
most rare diseases, and others that are aggressive and
have stvmied efforts to find a cure.20 IThese diseases,
which comprise many forms of highly lethal cancers,
would be at the bottom of the funding list under the
plain language of the comparative effectiveness regime
in the statute, and might not be covered at all under the
more stringent NICE provisions. 21
Comparative eff ectiveness addresses essentially
two issues: cost and treatment outcomes. The goal
of comparative effectiveness is to use science to
determine the best treatment for a patient or groups of
patients. One of the ways to determine which treatment
is "best" is to compare the cost and outcome of one
treatment to another.22 The better the outcome and the
lower the cost, the better the treatment or professional
service. Similarly, there are two primary types of
costs: professional services including the technical
services that assist the provision of professional
care, and prescription medicine. Both ty pes of
costs have incieased consideiably over the last tevw
decades. Third-party pay ers, both priblic and priv ate.
hayve iniplemented a number of techniques to trx to
niiinimize costs.2
T hird-partv payers in the private sector rise a xvaiiety
ot methods to control costs. like precertification or
preauthorization and utilization rev iexw. Io promote
or detei the use of certain drrugs, insurance companies
provide different levels of financial incentives on
multi-lexvel formularies.24 Private insurance cost
containment measures, however, are different from
government-run cost containment measures for two
reasons: 1) although an insurer may make a treatment
more expensive, it is unlikely to disallow completely
treatments deemed necessary by a doctor; and 2)
patients have a choice of insurance providers, albeit
a choice limited by a number of factors. Finally,
private companies generally respond more quickly
and more forcefully in response to campaigns against
the company.25 These differences between private
insurance and the new government-created health care
program lessen the finality of the decision to cover a
drug, treatment, or physician, thereby mitigating the
harm to terminal patients by providing alternatives.
A final consideration when implementing a cost
effectiveness structure for the health care system in the
United States is that the FDA does not consider cost
when deciding whether to approve a drug.26 A direct
correlation, however, exists between federal funding
for research and positive outcomes for fatal disease.
IHIV has evolved in the last few decades from a death
sentence to a more manageable, chronic condition.27
E ven metastatic breast cancer survival rates have
improved dramatically, From a ten-percent five-year
survival rate in 1974 to forty percent in 2000.28
Causative factors, genetic predisposition, disease
mechanisms, and possible curative methods are
unlikely to be discovered without the lifeline of federal
research dollars.29 Unfortunately, the health reform
law's focus on treatments that present "the potential
for new evidence to improve patient health" and bias
towards research that will have an "effect on national
expenditures associated with a health care treatment"
is likely to have a negative effect on federal funding
of clinical trials for the most desperately needed
therapies.0 TIhe FDA has acknowledged that more
aggressive diseases might require more aggressive
treatment,31 and that implementation of PPACA
should include guidelines to ensure that extremely
lethal conditions receive adequate funding in a non-
arbitrary manner.32
A. Healtlh Care Providers Should Use a Sliding
Scale to Balance Seriousness of Disease,
Alternative Treatments, and C ost
PPACA's health care proxvisions apply the concept
of 'burden to society' both in ternms of disease
prevalence and economic cost-to determine swhich
treatments are more effectisve. This application
presumably swillI adsversely affect ensverage for
drugs that are not "comparatively effective"' from a
prevalence and cost standpoint, and will most likely
lead to a chilling reduction of research Funds. Research
funds will be jeopardized at both the public and private
level. Private companies will not want to invest time
and money creating a product that third-party payers
will not cover. Federal funds will also be limited.
Although the comparative effectiveness model, in
its current form under PPACA, seeks to help a large
amount of people and not strain the budget,34 the
proposed system will limit coverage of therapies and
sty mie research and development, with potentially
devastating effects to patients.
In contrast, over the past fifty years, the FDA has
balanced varying interests from public safety to
industry concerns.3 The system is far from perfect:
it takes a new drug, on average, more than ten years
and hundreds of millions of dollars to get to market.36
After decades of being at one extreme or the other,
however, the FDA's dogged pursuit of the optimal
balance of safety, effectiveness, and in extreme cases,
need, is bringing the regulatory framework to an
appropriate equilibrium. IThe FDA's attempt to reach
out and include typically underrepresented patient
groups through programs like the Rare Diseases
Initiative advances patient care by ensuring that rare
but devastating diseases are not ignored. Ixpedited
approval for medication to treat diseases that are
highly lethal and for which no alternative treatments
are available provides a flexible regulatory framework
and offers a glimmer of hope for patients devastated by
disease. The FDA also developed a process to provide
individuals or groups of individuals access to a drug in
the early testing phase in extremely grim cases. 8 Ihese
alternative initiatives are useful examples of federal
bureaucracy working with patients and their doctors to
provide better health care while still adhering to the
principles of general safety and effectiveness that are
at the core of the regulatory system.
IThe approximately thirty-twso million people who are
projected to be covered under PPACA's health care
expansions will most likely be predominantly Medicaid
recipients and the already uninsured.39 These people
are less likely to have the foimal tiaining necessary to
dispute a claim denial effectisvely and vwill generally not
have the option of obtaining heifer insurance through
an employ er. Fuither, the elderly are much more likely
to haxve poor health, and aggiressixve forms of cancer
in particular, that vsill msake thenm more reliant on the
quality of their health care program than the axverage
middle-aged health care eonsumer.40 Although this
coxverage vsill benefit the traditionally under-sersved
vshen it comes to basic, traditional nmedical care, these
patients, if diagnosed vsith a terminal illness, are also
the most likely to be uninformed of the coverage
limitations and have the fewest opportunities to argue
successfully for appropriate care and services
These limitations have similar effects to some of
the behaviors criticized as predatory lending during
the recent subprime mortgage crisis. In an effort to
get people who could not afford a home into one.,
mortgage brokers would arrange for interest only, low
or no dosswn payments, or adjustable rate mortgages.41
Many people had no problems paying their monthly
mortgage bills, as long as the stock market was
performing well.4 Analogous, most people -would
benefit from the expansion of health care coverage, as
long as their health status remained in good condition
or there were standard treatments for their condition.
In the subprime mortgage crisis, once the system came
under tremendous pressure from either rising interest
rates or a balloon payment coining due, the asset of
home ownership became a liability, and the effort to
provide the "American dream" to everyone attacked
home prices and caused the entire economy to falter.43
'The systemic dangers faced in the home loan market
potentially augur what could happen if PPACA adopts
a more stringent cost containment stance, similar to
NIC, instead of adopting a more flexible regulatory
framework, like the FDA T.he provision of routine
health care to the elderly and the poor, like the goal of
home ownership, is a laudable one. Cost containment
measures work readily with routine care. Utilization of
physician assistants (PA) is one cost saving measure
that can provide high quality patient care by developing
stronger relationships with patients due to the lower
cost of a PA's time, while maintaining the more
specialized oversight of a physician.44 Most patients
in good health can benefit from the same general
advice-eat healthy foods, exercise, get regularly
screened, monitor blood pressure, and see a physician
annually.45 Once the "balloon pay ment of a serious
diagnosis enters the equation, hoswever, the standard
treatment regimen is no longer sufficient. Not only will
standard cost containment measures no longer provide
an adequate guide for the necessary specialized care,
but expert physicians are also harder to find and
treatments are fewer and much more expensive.46
(enemrally, the syoung, healthy or rich nre not the
ones sxho suffer under any third-party pay er sy stem
due to hick of access or cxtreme cost. Accordlinglx,
PPACA health care cenvisions supporting the elderly,
ill, unemployed and impov erished. PPACA must
mitigatc its emphasis on cost containmcnt in extremne
cases, specifically rare and orphan diseases, in faxvor of
prosviding treaument.47 Regulations should he enacted
noxs to ensure that PPACA's xvision of quality, efficient
health care is realized. L essons front the FDAX's attenipts
to provide access to experimental medication, and the
inequity of access which resulted from those measures,
are instructive to the PPACA franeswork, specifically
in balancing comparatively effective treatment and
optimal patient care.
Some of the provisions of the FDA rules implementing
expedited approval are not directly applicable. For
example, since PPACA should only cover treatments
that are operating under the auspices of the NIH, no
additional safety protocols or studies are necessary.48
T he requirement that the treatment show at least
preliminary clinical effectiveness or therapeutic
benefits, however, should be rated using a balancing
scale to ensure that only appropriate treatments
and drugs are covered.49 The FDA's definition of
life-threatening disease-one where the likelihood
of death is high unless the course of the disease is
interruptedso-could readily be adopted to determine
when comparative effectiveness measures should
appropriately be relaxed. The strict focus on survival as
the only outcone vorth funding should be avoided.51
At this point in health care technology development,
many diseases and conditions result in fatality. Several
factors should be considered when determining
whether the cost is worth the treatment, including
survivability and the impact on the day-to-day quality
of life of the patient. The latter is particularly important
in terminal cases.
This balanced approach would help realize the vision
of access to affordable health care, while minimizing
some of the most widely criticized pitfalls of other
systems. tor example, if NICE implemented a more
flexible comparative effectiveness framework, women
with terminal, metastatic breast cancer 55would have
access to lapatinib, a better therapy that wx ould provide
women with an average of ten more weeks with their
families and reduce their cancer-associated pain.52 This
result is especially effective and equitable considering
that the manufacturer is willing to pay for twelve
weeks of treatment per patient. Furthermore, NICE
coverage limitations were originally intended to cap
the runawsay costs of non-life saving drugs like Viagra,
not life-extending cheniotherapy. 54 At the same time
that this proposed iregulatoiry f rameswork wsould ensure
lifesnaving trentinents to terminal patients. it could
also prosvide comnparauively effective options for more
people. To continue wvith the breast cancer cxample,
some studies indicate that mammograms should be
giv en at a later age and at a lowxer fr'equcncy in patients
wsithout elcxatcd risk tactors." Prosviding flexibility
by adopting souse of the progressiv e standards
pronmulgated by the FD)A under PEAC A could enforce
the cost sayviing measures of feswer mamnmogramns
for the general population, wxhile giving the handful
of women with terminal metastatic breast cancer
additional valuable time with their loved ones.
B. The Lessons Learned by the FDA in
its Attempts to Provide Equal Access to
Investigational Drug Studies Should be Used
by Other Agencies to Ensure that Pre-existing
Biases Against Rare and Orphan Drugs are not
Exacerbated Under PPACA
One of the primary concerns the FDA addressed when
altering the rules to the "fast track" program was the
unequal distribution of access to investigational drugs
to rural areas and other underserved populations.56
Most of the investigational trials were conducted at
large, research-based, academically-related hospitals,
not accessible by rural and poor patients.57 Serious
illness can transform a straightforward fifty-mile
trip into a treacherous and expensive affair. A high
percentage of terminally ill patients are unable to
transport themselves to specialized care centers.58
In addition to the inequities the FDA tackled vhile
implementing the fast-track process, the NICE program
illustrates the likely inequities that would result from
implementing the comparative effectiveness model.
Approval for federal funding and patient care coverage
is more likely for prevalent diseases and diseases
with organized advocacy groups than smaller or
unorganized lobbying groups. NICE has spent £21
billion on outreach and other attempts to equalize
treatment, while denying tens of thousands of U.K.
patients treatments considered the standard care in the
United States and continental Europe. Despite the
creation of Life Sustaining Protocols to provide more
options for terminal patients under NICE, thousands
of patients are denied life-extending coverage every
year.60 For example, NICE determined that a drug
called Sutent would double the life expectancy of
kidney cancer patients compared to the alternative
treatments, but average was denied. After an uproar
over the denial of coverage of four kidney cancer drugs,
including Sutent-all denied after the Life Sustaining
Piotocols sseie implemented-NICEI approved the
diug61 IThe manutacturer of one ot the denied diugs,
Bay er, cven offered to prosvide the treatment for free
to Biitish patients, but NICE refused to approve it. 62
In contrast, most prisvate insurers in the United States
cover these treatments.63
These inequities vsill lead to longer survival rates for
sonic diseases, and shorter suisvival rates for otheis. T he
fiv e-y ear survival rate for hireast cancer in the United
Kingdom is seventy-seven percent, while the five-
year survival rate for prostate cancer is only seventy
percent.64 In comparison, the five-year survival rate
for breast cancer in the United States is ninety percent
and more than ninety-percent for prostate cancer.65
Approximately two hundred thousand people are
diagnosed with breast or prostate cancer in the United
States each year,6 and survivability for both these
diseases is similar despite a large disparity in research
funding in the United States,. due primarily to the size
and organization of the different advocacy groups.67
'The primary reason for the more favorable coverage
and treatment alternatives for breast cancer is the
organized lobbying efort, and that is unlikely to change
if a comparative effectiveness model is implemented
in the United States. Breast cancer already has much
higher survivability rates, even in the metastatic stages,
than some of the worst cancers in the early stages. 8
Under the plain reading of the PPACA statute, this
would tilt the bias in favor of more funding toward
clinical research for breast cancer because it affects
a larger number of people and has better chances for
treatment. That bias is further exacerbated by the huge
lobbying efforts promoting breast cancer assareness
and research. In 2007 alone, the National Cancer
Institute dedicated $572.4 million to breast cancer
research the National Institutes ofl ealth gave another
$705 million., and the Department of Defense set up its
own breast cancer research facility with another $138
million.69 Pancreatic cancer, which is diagnosed in
about forty-thousand people annually, received a mere
$73.3 million in federal funding despite killing almost
the same number of people per year as breast cancer.)0
A rigid comparative effectiveness regulatory regime
will intensify pre-existing funding biases at work
against the elderly and the very ill by determining vhat
coverage millions of Americans will be able to afford.
Removing thirty-two million people, particularly those
more likely to suffer from terminal diseases, from
the pool of people who can access certain types of
treatment will have a chilling effect on the research
and development of new therapies for orphan diseases.
Obtaining a sponsor and approval tor orphan drugs is
alieads v eiy ditficult, despite progiams desveloped by
the 1FDA specifically to encouiage the development
ot tools to fight these devastating conditions.
Implementing a sy stem of cnst-cniscinus cnmpamrative
effectisveness militates against treatments that vsill
help a smaller percentage of the population, sshich
ssill amplify the pre-existino market biases against the
development of orphan drugs.
It is contradietoiy to reimburse federally the costs
associated vsillh a clinlical trial (exceptinsg the cost of
the drug and administrative fees), while thwarting
the potential for federal research funding during the
pre-trail and post-approval phases. Medicare currently
reimburses for clinical trials and investigative studies of cancer treatments
and diagnostic tools that are in the earl) stages of the testing process to
obtain FDA approval. Given that Medicare/NIedicaid spending currently
accounts more than forty percent of all health care spending and that
PR\CA will add to that number, the potential to profit from drugs that
only extend life to some degree or only work for certain patients would
significantly decline under a NICE-style framework.73
Instead, implementing agencies should recognize that the
current system attempts to incentivize -work on orphan
drugs and should promulgate regulations that further this
aim instead of hindering it.
The goal of incentivizing the creation of drugs and therapies
to treat more rare and fatal conditions can be realized by v hsk
adopting a view of equal access that recognizes the value
of treatments for terminal diseases. Under the standard
comparative effectiveness model, rules that guarantee funding for rare and
orphan drugs and acknowledge that the results of the study (e.g. providing
ten more weeks of life) might not ultimately result in a cure, would spur
research and development in those areas. The regulatory framework
developed by the FDA, such as the definitions for orphan drugs and rare
diseases, should be applied to research funding decisions to provide a
regulatory exception to spur development for treatment of orphan drugs
and rare diseases.74
Absent these safeguards, access will depend on the strength of a particular
disease's lobbying and organizational efforts, and the potential for positive,
cost effective outcomes. This result would increase the bias in the health
care industry, where the patients most in need of treatment that could bring
more comfortable final days receive less funding than the patients with a
disease that has a strong pro-research lobbying effort and existing effective
treatments. qual access is an important goal that should be fostered by
PPACA, not hindered by it. Federal agencies can ensure enhanced equity of
access both by pursuing the standards already used by the FDA to encourage
orphan drug development and by setting aside comparative effectiveness
funding specifically for terminal and difficult-to-treat diseases.
PRACA will require massive resources to implement, and regulatory
provisions are still forthcoming.' It remains unclear hos regulators will
determine which treatments are covered and how much of a role containment
cost will play. Statutory language emphasizes that cost is at least one
considcration for the prosvision of trcatmcnt and rescarch funding.6 the
British cxperience indicates that the dedication to more efficient paticnt
care can esvolse into a discretc dollar salue on the liscs of people." The
rhetoric used to disiss PPACA's comparative effectisveness prosvisions as
'death panels" not only refused to acknovsledge the usefulness and dire
need for cost containment measures in general care, but also did nothing
to advance the needs ot patients in the most desperate circumstances.8
PR\CA' did not establish death panels," but regulatory agencies vsill be
tasked swith some very difficult decisions, including hows to distinguish
betvseen standard care, wshere more rigid cost containment measures are
safety and efficiency of drugs through many political administrations,
emerging diseases, and technologies. The fairly recent developments of
balancing safety and efficacy with patient autonomy has, for the most
part, enriched those patients lives and scientific understanding of different
disease processes and treatments. The measured approach that attempts to
balance competing factors like the harshness of a disease, while ensuring
that patients are not buying an unknown quantity, is a model
on hosw to reconcile the competing aims presented by
........ comparative effectiveness.
.. Creating a more inclusive framework will also alleviate
the biases already present in the system, which incentivize
in. research in fields where the hope of a good outcome
is more realistic and limit the access of the poor and ill
Devastating illness, poverty, and old age are often linked.80
The expanded PPACA programs -intending to cover the
thirty-two million people who are uninsured due to unemployment, lack
of employer-prosvided coverage, and a number of other reasons- should
consider the failed attempts in the United Kingdom to ensure equitable
coverage.Si Also instructive are the processes developed by the FDA in
the United States to minimize disparities in care that can result after a rare
disease diagnosis.
The elimination of waste in government spending is important, but the
government should not alleviate that concern at the expense of lives.
Patients and their families should not have to endure anguish in addition
to a devastating diagnosis because better therapies are available but too
expensive to cover. Ihe state has always asserted an interest in protecting
human life at all stages, from fetal development to end of life decisions.8
This assertion of an interest in human life does not come without a cost, but
for a dying person, an extra six months of life is priceless.
appropriate, and vhen cost concerns must give way to the value of life.
The FDA has evolved from a small agency focused solely on the safety
of so-called medications to a health care behemoth that has ensured the
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